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PUNISHMENT: THE REWARD FOR GUILT
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of punishment for transgression appears to have universal
application. It is manifest, so far as the authors can ascertain, in one form or
another in every society. Perhaps its origin lay in the need of primitive man to
protect himself against the threats of other men and beasts; later, the book of
Genesis portrayed punishment being meted out for transgressions against the
word of God. As late as the 17th and 18th centuries animals were tried in
France, Germany, Switzerland and Spain, and punished for injuries perpetrated
upon persons and property,' while in England "deodands" (instruments which
caused the death of "any reasonable creature") were forfeited to the king for
purposes of appeasing God's wrath.2 When the massacre of offenders later gave
way to the banishment of such individuals, the razing of their property served
as an efficient outlet for the hostility which was previously directed at the
offenders' persons. A form of punishment which still exists in remote areas of the
world is known as the blood feud, which finds its basis in the fact that every man
harbors wishes and desires for power. It shows itself most strongly in the destruction of an opponent, whereby a sense of security is gained.
Corporal punishment, which lasted for centuries, has for the most part been
entirely abandoned in most civilized countries because of its degrading effect on
society and the resulting embitterment and hostility which the victim experienced.
Imprisonment, a relatively modern penalty, was virtually unknown in the middle
ages; however, it became more prevalent by the end of the 16th century for
increasing numbers of minor crimes for which it was thought undesirable to
inflict the death penalty.3 Some of the oldest forms of punishment still survive in
modern society. Deportation has been employed by European nations for the
last two thousand years in the form of exile to a penal colony. The brutal severity
of these ancient modes of punishment is perhaps explained by the fact that
criminals excite the emotional reaction of fear in both the victim and society.
These fearful impulses tend to becloud our intellectual processes, causing society
to relapse to blind defensive reflexes which find their expression in primitive
4
retaliation, terrorism and the lex talionis.
Both conceptually and pragmatically punishment appears changed in modern
society from its origins; however, the deep emotional connection with the prinZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 257 (1943).
2. R BSON, CIVILIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF LAw 85, 86 (1935).
3. In 1810 Romilly, the great English reformer, introduced a bill to abolish
capital punishment for stealing goods worth five shillings. It Is shocking to note
that the House of Lords defeated the bill by al vote of 31 to 11; WILSON, THE
CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 161 (1934).
4. 12 ENCYC. SoC. SCL 712 (1934.)
1.
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ciple of considering the punishment as atonement and expiation is still highly
operative today.5 Generally we may observe that punishment in its classic sense
is still the dominant basic mode of coping with "criminal behavior"; although
attempts have been made toward its abolition in varying degrees, as in isolated
areas of criminal law, these attempts are at best of relatively meagre significance.
In forty-two out of the forty-eight states we still find capital punishment
prescribed; 6 in only fourteen of these forty-two states has capital punishment been
restricted to one crime.
The failure of punishment to secure the social good has motivated enlightened
theorists,7 here and abroad, to seek an adequate substitute for a deterrent which
had its inception in a primitive mind. Currently this substitute has taken the
the form of therapy and treatment directed to reach the efficient cause for the
deviant behavior in the criminal; this aims at exercising a deterrent effect upon
the individual in question by means of obviating the need for digression. Attempts
to introduce this substitute for punishment into our current legal system have been
relatively unsuccessful.8
II. IMMUNIZATION FROM PUNISHMENT
Under our present system no criminal responsibility is imputed to certain
classes, defined by the legislature, which are immunized from punishment in the
classic sense because of certain mental or chronological incapacities. The reasons
for this immunization are various; the desire of society to impose punishment
upon all offenders against the accepted standards of conduct is tempered by a
realization that, morally, some consideration must be given to those who are not
responsible for their acts, those whose asocial acts are rather beast-like9 than
human. Extension of this immunization to individuals who should be included in
the exempt group according to our advanced medical and psychological informa5. ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 67, 75,
219 (Zilboorg transl. 1931).
6. 45 J. CRim. L., C. & P. S. 691 (1945).
7. See DESSION, CRIMINAL LAw, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER (1948).
8. E.g., the state of California, having perhaps the most enlightened sexual
offender program, utilizes some of the most advanced thinking by offering an
extended therapy program to its inmates under almost ideal conditions. However,
It is revealing to note that after the period of therapy and after the rehabilitation
(psychological) of the inmate, he is then subjected to the ordinary form of
punishment, namely imprisonment, which subverts the entire concept of treatment and rehabilitation by reverting to the ancient concept of the lex talionis. This
evinces the inability of the legislature and the courts to abandon the "classic" form
of punishment. CAL. GEN. LAWVS ANN. §§5500-5521, esp. §5517.
9. Artold's Case, 16 Howe St. Tr. 695 (1724): "It must be a man that is
totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and does not know what he
is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." See also
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); and WEIHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954).
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ton is not presently feasible, in as much as there is a current dearth of facilities
for treatment and a substantial lack of funds with which to increase them. Significantly, the reluctance of society, via the legislature, to bear the financial burden of
alleviating this situation would seem to indicate an unwillingness to reduce the
incidence of punishment even where medical knowledge and scientific data
deemed it.
III. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
There ate three relevant theories'0 on which are based the ethics and desirability of punishment, as envisioned by our society. The first is vengeance, which
is retrospective. The vengeance may be expressed for its own sake, to restore
the esthetic balance, as a way of making reparations, to appease the gods, as a
form of expiation by the offender, or to appease the "lynch instincts"'" inherent
in the victim of the accused, his friends, his relatives, or the populace. The deterrence theory, on the other hand, is prospective, looking to prevent the commission
of social damage.' 2 The ultimate goal here is to inhibit others from indulging
in these acts, by using the present offender as notorious advertisement to potential offenders of the unpleasant consequences of crime. Parenthetically, the act of
punishment also exerts its influence on the rest of the populace, in that a vicarious
feeling of "goodness" is attained by reaffirming the moral code. The recidivistic
theory contemplates the prevention of future damage to society by the individual
offender who is the object of the punishment. Since he has already manifested antisocial tendencies, it appears probable that such behavior may reoccur unless he is
removed from society.
The ultimate issue for our purposes thus resolves itself into the question of
whether the transgressor should be punished, treated, or isolated. Ideally, it is
proposed by Strahorn 3 that "the rule should be to apply treatment [or punishment] to those who are likely to repeat, to acquit those whose likelihood is too
slight to be important, and to scale the length and nature of the treatment in
terms of the relative likelihood of recidivism:'
10. Strahorn Griminology and the Law of Guilt, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 491
(1936).
11. Colorado abolished the death penalty and was forced to reinstate It
because lynching and violence increased. It is thus thought that the need for
retribution is so deeply imbedded in the thinking and emotional makeup of the
people that they will take law enforcement into their own hands If It is not
"adequately" dispensed by the proper enforcement agencies. Punishment for
heinous crimes is generally severe, not only for the purpose of penalizing the
criminal but also to appease the thirst for blood which becomes manifest In
lynching.
12. "Men are not hanged for stealing horses, but that horses may not be
stolen," LORD HALIFAX, WORKS, 229.
13. See Strahorn, op. cit. supra note 10, at 494.
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Notwithstanding the occasional expression of such ideas, we are inevitably
led to the conclusion that society jealously adheres to its right to punish for
transgressions. There appears to be a basic, primitive need to exert such punishment on the transgressor, and it is this need which dominates our current attitudes toward crime and punishment, rather than the lip service which is paid to
the deterrence which punishment may accomplish. It may be of the greatest
practical importance to determine what motivates such societal needs. An individual may experience feelings of guilt when he has perpetrated an act which
according to his concept of morality constitutes prohibited behavior; or, as Freud
points out,14 the mere awareness of the intention to commit an act which is
defined as asocial by the individual will occasion guilt feelings. "The tension
between the strict superego (conscience) and the subordinate ego (self) we may
call the sense of guilt: it manifests itself in a need for punishment."15 "The
superego torments the sinful ego with al feeling of dread and watches for
opportunities whereby the outer world can be made to punish it."'16 It is necessary
to point out at this stage that the sense of guilt which has its origin in crimes committed or contemplated is repressed by the ego, so that the dynamics of guilt and
expiation by punishment are totally on a unconscious level, and the individual
is usually unaware of these processes. It may be considered as general knowledge
that all people in our society are to some extent plagued with a sense of guilt,
born of the accumulation of minor digressions which society does not punish, or
of which society is unaware. Certainly it is generally accepted that even where
these elements are said to be non-existent, there is a latent desire in each of us to
perpetrate forbidden acts. As we have seen previously, the mere awareness of the
desire to transgress may occasion guilt feelings which the individual feels can
only be purged by punishment. Punishing others may accomplish the necessary
effect of purging these guilt feelings in the individual, in that there is a vicarious
identification with the person who is so punished. Punishment of other offenders
aids the superego in suppressing the hostile instincts of the Id (unconscious,
instinctive drives), for the demonstration of punishment acts as an ominous
warning. To state it more graphically, it is easier to subordinate evil impulses
when there is a practical threat to the ego of loss of status, love or liberty, and the
fear of pain which are the consequences of the ominous punishment. 17 From this
we might conclude that the fear of punishment does have a practical, significant
deterrent effect upon the hostile asocial manifestations latent in the normal
individual, and it would appear at this preliminary stage of analysis that the
incidence of crime in any given area should be inversely proportionate to the
threat of severe punishment.
14. See FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 106 (Riviere transl. 1930).
15. Id., at 105.
16. Id., at 108.
17. See ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra note 5, at 6.
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IV. EFFORTS OF PUNISHMENT ON THE INDIVIDUAL
Punishment serves not only as a deprivation of basic needs and desires, but
it also has the more significant effect of ostracizing the individual from society,18
transplanting him into an outgroup. Other elements are the social stigma attached
to punishment for crime, deprivation of community respect and economic opportunity, and loss of prestige, status and honor. Since there is a need in the individual
to associate and be accepted in a group, he almost invariably seeks refuge, acceptance, and prominence in the outgroup, which is inevitably comprised of individuals
similarly ostracized from society.
Our penal system relies largely on imprisonment of the individual offender, to
the extent that this imprisonment has become synonymous with the entire concept
of punishment. Prison environments are among the most unnatural and artificial
environments in which human beings have ever been placed. What is more
unnatural and perverse than a milieu in which men are separated from women
within the confines of high walls, forcibly engaged in tedious labor? How
unrealistic it is to assume that people will develop self-restraint where they are
herded like animals, where they live in close proximity with others who have
shown disrespect for authority, and where the need for self-expression is completely stifled. 19 Beyond these environs a similarly abnormal situation exists in
the homes of these men, where children are deprived of parental companionship,
guidance and support. The system of imprisonment, although it may accomplish
its punitive isolation function, does not accomplish its rehabilitory goal.
Ideally, punishment must not have an effect of disgracing the individual in
the eyes of his peers, but rather it "must bring about a [moral and psychological] ...
regeneration . . . To this end punishment should prepare and give assurance of
social reinstatement and never impose an indelible stigma . . . There is a growing
sentiment in favor of abolishing punishment that dishonors and of discarding
the distinction made between infamous and non-infamous punishment."
This
indelible stigma is often the source of criminal recidivism; the individual
branded as a criminal intellectually and emotionally tends to maintain this role,
thus precluding any possibility of rehabilitation and readjustment as a conforming member of the community. If one is labelled a "criminal" society will
react to him as such; since the character and personality of each individual
mirrors to a great extent the attitudes and reactions of others toward him, the
"criminal" will almost necessarily assume the role in which he is forcibly cast.
18. See SALLEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT 189-209 (2d ed.
1911); see also, CANTOR, CRIME AND SOCIETY 227 et seq. (1939).
19. See CANTOR, op. cit supra note 18, at 304 et seq.
20. See SALEILLES, op. cit. supra-note 18, at 269.
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V. CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMINALS
We have broadly surveyed the requirements and effects of punishment of
deviant acts from the perspective of society. In order that we may evolve some
understanding as to the direction in which punishment must be oriented effectively
to reduce crime, we must now turn our attention to the needs of the individual
and the effects of punishment upon him. At this point we shall use an arbitrary
and oversimplified classification of criminals for purposes of clarity and analysis:
normal, neurotic and psychotic. Since, under existing psychiatric techniques, little
if anything can be accomplished with psychotic criminals and certain categories
of neurotic criminals, we shall for practical considerations confine our attention
mainly to the effects of punishment on the normal and the less extreme neurotic
criminals.
VI. PUNISHMENT FOR CONSISTENCY
The normal criminal can be subdivided into two categories. One comprises
those whose likelihood of repeating the criminal act is so small as to be insignificant; the other includes those who, because they are members of a group which
does not consider criminal acts to be socially or morally objectionable, or because
they view crime as a business and punishment as only a business risk, or for any
of scores of reasons, are likely to continue to commit crimes. In those cases where
we might accurately predict that there would be no incidence of recidivism, the
only apparent legitimate motives for the imposition of punishment are for
purposes of consistency 2' or as a deterrent to potential transgressors. Many
authorities in criminology rigidly adhere to the conception that the law must
show itself to be inflexible, so as not to undermine the Authority or pervert
punishment into an idle threat.22 In many cases where a particular criminal
would appear to have little or no recidivistic tendency, it might serve the purposes
of the state to make certain exceptions in the administration of punishment, in
order that a first offender might take a useful place in society rather than be
confined to the sort of imprisonment which can legitimately be called a school
for hardened criminals. The difficulty with such individualized treatment has
generally been conceived as twofold; it is not expedient for the administration of
criminal justice to water down the deterrent effect by making exceptions, and the
people's cry for vengeance and expiation must be satisfied by the legislature and
the judiciary.
21.

See

ASCHAFFENBURG, CRIME AND ITS REPRESSION

369 (1895, Leipzig).
cit. supra note 21, at 232,

.AUFGABEN DER STRAFRECHTSPFLEGE

22.

ASCRAFFENBURG,

Op.

156 (1913);

SCHMIDT,

Diu
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VII.

GUILT FEELINGS

Let us, then, re-examine the dynamics of punishment on the emotional makeup
of the "normal" criminal in the light of these claims. As to those who suffer no
stigma in their group as a result of violation of a legal canon, we may generalize
that the commission of the prohibited act will not cause the criminal to suffer
guilt feelings, since, as we have noted, guilt feelings are occasioned by the superego's demanding expiation from the ego. But peculiarly we find that here the
superego is in conformity with the ego, in that the commission of a crime against
"society" is not in conflict with the superego; rather, it is in such cases a method
of attaining prestige in the outgroup. But the other classification of the normal
criminal, the non-recidivist, is usually severely plagued by pangs of conscience.
His superego is conventional, from the perspective of society, and thus the commission of a crime constitutes a severe moral infraction as viewed by the superego;
the ultimate result is that the superego demands expiation from the sinful ego,
which normally takes the form of a need for punishment to purge the individual
of his guilt feelings.
VIIL

DENIAL OF PUNISHMENT-CONSEQUENCES

What effect, then, does the deprivation of punishment have on the demanding
superego, since the latter will relentlessly demand "justice" in the form of punishment? In many cases we find that where society does not by itself punish the
transgression, the individual will be impelled by unconscious forces to impose
punishment upon himself in order to facilitate the appeasement of the superego.
23
This may take the form of what is commonly referred to as accident proneness,
the "compulsive" tendency of certain individuals to consistently court danger and
the potential injuries which follow therefrom. Accident proneness may manifest
itself in such acts as jay-walking and taking other risks both as a pedestrian and
driver, to an extent that any average person would deem irrational; manifestations
of negligence in daily routine activities are illustrated by recurrent injuries to
which the individual unconsciously subjects himself. The writers suggest that
another method by which the guilt-ridden individual may gratify his need for
punishment is by repetition of the prohibited acts, thereby unconsciously seeking
punishment from society, or external authority.
It is not illogical to conclude that in many cases recidivism may have its roots
in the frustration of the desires and need for punishment. We may ask ourselves,
then, whether punishment could not serve the important function of eradicating
the need for commiting socially deviant acts, the results of which are ultimately
23.

See

MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF

(1938).
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calculated to pacify the stern superego. 24 A contrary view is suggested by those
who advocate the abolition of punishment, who reason that once the superego's
wrath is appeased, the ego is purged of guilt.25 An extreme view is taken by
certain criminologists26 who suggest that kindness may serve as a more effective
deterrent to crime than punishment to the individual.
The Freudian school conceives of punishment as a means of expiation; it
frees the ego from the confines or restrictions imposed by the now eradicated
guilt, which theoretically may invite further digression, followed by further guilt
and the consequent need of punishment. A vicious circle of crime, guilt and
expiation (punishment) is thus created. These manifestations usually exert their
influence on certain categories of neurotic criminals and on the normal criminal,
the offender whose likelihood to repeat criminally sanctioned acts is improbable.
Franz Alexander expressed it dramatically by stating, "the tyrannical period of
punishment during which the superego celebrates its sadistic, punitive orgies is
27
followed by a manic phase of release."
IX. KINDNESS AS DETERRENCE
Alexander and Staub propose 28 that kindness may be the means of breaking
the vicious circle, theorizing that kindnesss, being conceptually in opposition to
punishment, will further increase the inhibitory restraint on the ego, because the
sinful slate is not wiped clean except by punishment or atonement. Thus the ego
is not freed to impel the commission of additional transgressions. There need be
no justification to the individual for what he considers unjust punishment, and it
is incongruous to react to kindness with hostility. This seemingly humane method
of dealing with criminal offenders has its obvious shortcoming when viewed from
the traditional deterrent theory of punishment, 2 in that kindness can hardly be
regarded as deterrent in nature.
In this connection, we should examine the
validity and practicality of punishment as a deterrent. As we have seen, deterrence
has been rationalized as a dominant justification for the imposition of pains and
penalties on the criminal. However, we have questioned the validity of this
concept by pointing out that its true origin may lie in the need for a societal
vengeance and balancing of the "esthetic scales of justice." It appears that punishment has little or no practical significance to the majority of the class of neurotic
criminals, or a fortiori, to the psychotic criminals, since punishment for this class
24. This is discussed in detail infrat, p. XX-XX.
25. See FREUD, Op. cit. supra note 14, ch. 7.
26. See A..EXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra note 5, at 69.
27. See ALEXANDER, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL

(Glueck & Lewin transl., 3rd ed., 1946).
28. See ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra note 5, at 68-69,
29. See supra, p. X.

PERSONALITY

31

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
may indeed be the motivating factor for the criminal acts.3 0 By way of confirmation, criminologists have pointed out that the high degree of recidivism indicates
the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent to the individual. Crimes are often
born of an abnormal need for notoriety and martyrism, and history reinforces to
some degree the theoretical position of the ineffectiveness of punishment. To note
one example, the punitive attempts to suppress Judaism and Christianity served
only to intensify the evangelical efforts of their followers; in at least some cases
punishment seems to incite its recipients to over-compensatory retaliation.
Authority in the form of statistics, which reinforces the proposition that
punishment is an inefficient deterrent, is abundant.31 However, we may legitimately
question the validity of many such surveys, since the information is usually
obtained in penal institutions or from known criminals. The St. Louis, Missouri,
Association for Criminal Justice conducted a survey in 1926 showing that only
one out of every 1,000 crimes committed in Missouri ever led to actual punishment of the offenders.-" Inasmuch as those who are captured once are almost
invariably recaptured time after time, we may infer that the criminal aggressions
of these recurrent offenders have a self-destructive motive (since unexpressed hostility is turned inward), incorporated in a quest for the infliction of self-punishment.3 3 No statistics, however, are available on the number of potential criminals
on the verge of committing a crime who are deterred by the threat of societal
retribution, though one could estimate that the number is substantial.
In order to document the theory that kindness may be the proper method of
coping with criminal aggressions, Messrs. Alexander and Staub 4 cite the example
found in Les Miserables, wherein the beneficent priest retaliated to the theft of his
property with kindness and understanding, rather than the vindictive, hostile
attitude which currently prevails. As we have indicated before, the objectives of
deterrence can hardly be facilitated by kind treatment of criminal offenders; there
is an anomaly in rewards being the wages of sin. The interesting question presents
itself of whether the reaction of kindness to a given criminal act will have a
deterrent effect upon potential criminals. Some theorists3 5 imply that it is difficult
even for the hardened criminal to react to kindness with an attitude of further
hostility and aggression. It is said that the superego is further buttressed in its
attempt to keep in check the hostile drives manifested in the Id or ego, while, on
30. E.g., a masochist seeks sexual gratification through punishment. See
& KATZ, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 326 (1948).
31. See S.&E. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930).

THORPE

32.
(1926).
33.
34.
35.

See MOLEY,
See S.&E.

THE

GLUECK,

ADMINISTRAT.ION

OF CRIMINAL

op. cit. supra note 31.

JUSTICE IN

See ALEXANDER & STAUB, op. cit. supra note 5, at 68.

Id., at 69.

MISSOURI
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the other hand, punishment tends to relieve the superego of the necessity of keeping
its moral vigil upon the Id and ego.
Let us now critically examine the psychoanalytic validity of these conceptions.
As we have seen, the superego torments the sinful ego upon the occasion of an
infringement upon the moral authority, and thus are occasioned guilt feelings in
the individual, or, indeed, hostility against the moral authority, which way be
individually conceived of as hostility toward the original authority, the parent.
However, such feelings of hostility against the moral authority are frustrated in
their expression; thus, axiomatically, the hostility is repressed and turned inward,
manifesting the result in many cases of what Freud refers to as the death drive
(self-destructive motives). When punishment is meted out for an act of aggression, the guilt of the individual, to a large extent, finds ventilation. When kindness
alone36 is substituted for the punishment, the individual is further inhibited in the
expression of hostility, since the superego becomes more ominous and better
fortfied. We may, therefore, generalize, that since the inhibition of hostility
expression increases, the hostility turned inward proportionately increases. The
result can be conceived of as an increase in the self-destructive or death motives,
which again may find their expression in repetition of crime; the individual may
seek relief and expiation of his guilt feelings at the hands of society, and may
strive to achieve this end in the further commission of more serious crimes to
which society will be forced to retaliate. An enlightening example of these
mechanisms may be found in the case of the first man sentenced to death in
Kansas in fifty years. A manuscript left by him disclosed his incredible criminal
career; he committed 23 murders, numerous thefts, and spent 22 years in jails
and reform schools. This criminal, an extremely intelligent person, was completely
aware of his motives, drives and needs. He sought to satisfy his need for punishment by criminal recidivism through "deliberate" captures. His goal was death,
the maximum punishment, which he ultimately obtained only through artifices
designed to decoy the court and psychiatrists, who recommended leniency and
treatment rather than the death sentence. The manuscript recounted the condemned
man's excessive hatred, scorn and contempt for all human beings, himself being
the most despicable.
Y, INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT
A current movement is afoot among informed criminologists, who advocate
individualized treatment for the criminal, viewing most classic forms of punish36. Psychanalytically perceived, kindness, in order to facilitate rehabilitation, would have to be supplemented with a technique, administered in an atmosphere of understanding and acceptance, whereby the criminal would be led
to understand and accept those forces which originally impelled or created hostility and which are now turned against society.
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ment as barbaric. 37 If an effective functional purpose is to be attributed to punishment (i.e., if it is administered as a rehabilitory and reformative rather than as
a retributive device) then "it necessarily follows that the punishment must be
adapted to the nature of the individual to whom it is applied."38 Not only must
punishment be individualized, but the individualization must be based on objective
experience rather than on "deceptive common sense."30 Such objective experience
cannot be gleaned from similar cases, but must be based on an individual diagnosis
of the offender by competent psychologists and psychiatrists. To generalize from
cases of other criminals who may have certain characteristics in common with the
offender is highly dangerous in this area, for a minor variance in personality trait
may become crucial when viewed from the perspective of beneficial psychiatric
individualization. It is necessary here to distinguish between individualization of
punishment and individualization of treatment. Individualization of punishment,
as we shall have occasion to use this term, involves psychoanalytical determination
of what in fact can constitute "punishment" to a given individual. As we have
discussed, punishment can be the desired end or motivating factor which occasioned the criminal act; to inflict punishment, as commonly conceived, on such
individuals would be nothing more than gratification of their sociopathic needs.
Individualized treatment, on the other hand, refers to the process whereby the
individual is psychoanalytically treated with the ultimate goal of eradicating the
need for transgression. To some extent the law presently gives discretion to the
sentencing judge to individualize punishment as prescribed within the confines
of a given statute. However, such discretion is far too subjective, and far too often
dependent on the emotional disposition of the judge at the time.40 Similarly, in

the cases of parole, a panel of laymen rather than psychological specialists becomes
the final arbiter of whether a man is ready to take his rightful place in society.
The late Professor George Dession,41 more than any other criminologist, has done
some of the most advanced thinking in this area of punishment-individualization,
proposing that a board of experts composed of psychologists and psychiatrists be
set up to objectively determine the length of sentence and advisability of parole,
but emphasizing the guarantee of procedural due process. 42 However, there are
many problems which require solution in this area of individualized treatment and
punishment. Perhaps the major difficulty, which circumscribes the entire problem,
is that of changing drastically the societal attitudes toward criminal behavior, and
vitiating the primitive need for retribution. Derivative problems are encountered
37.
38.

See SALEILLES, Op. Cit. supra note 18.
Id., at 9.

39. See S.&E. GLUECK, Op. cit. supra note 31.
40. See ASCHAFFENBURG, op. cit. supra note 21.
41. Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE
L. J. 319 (1938).
42.

DESSION,

CRIMINAL LA'V, ADMINISTRATION

113, 142-145 (1948).

AND PUBLIC ORDER 93-99, 105-
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in the insufficiency of funds available to set up facilities for treatment, and to
remedy the great shortage of trained personnel to treat these people.43 There is
general agreement in the psychiatric profssion that adequate treatment requires in
many cases two or three years, and this assumes willingness and cooperation by
the patient. Needless to add, such cooperation by criminals who are involuntarily
required to undergo treatment is not forthcoming. Even under ideal therapeutic
conditions, such rehabilitory therapy often fails.
The great difficulty with the proposed establishment of a panel of experts to
recommend therapy or punishment is that due process would be sacrificed, since it
would not afford the defendant an adversary proceeding where no formal
criminal prosecution is brought against him. 44 Under the present law in many
states45 there are facilities for treatment rather than punishment. The difficulty
mentioned above becomes manifest here, in that the law does not in most cases
guarantee the defendant even nominal due process where involuntary treatment
is foisted upon him. 46 Thus in many cases, other than those involving capital
offenses, it may be advisable for defendant's counsel not to plead insanity, since
the provisions for treatment usually are couched in terms of an indeterminate
47
sentence.
XI.

A COMPROMISE SOLUTION

In the light of the great difficulties of individualized treatment and society's
unwillingness to renounce vengeful retaliation, a break with the principles of the
lex talionis in the near future seems unlikely. However, a workable temporary
compromise might involve a brief but comprehensive diagnosis which would
indicate the utility of imposing "positive sanctions." We speak of "positive
sanctions" rather than punishment since we have found "punishment" to connote
the expression of societal hostility directed at the offender; this has the
effect of stigmatizing the violator forever, which leads to a host of undesirable
consequences. Positive sanctions, on the other hand, are intended to include
punishment which does not lack in severity but which should ideally be sterilized
43. Dession, op. cit. supra note 41, at 328-339.
44. Id., at 319.
45. E.g., N. Y. PENAL LAw §§2188, 2189-a; as of 1951, sixteen jurisdictions had
sexual psychopath statutes: California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Washington. See Note, New
York's New Indeterminate Sentence Law for Sex Offenders, 60 YALE L. J. 346
(1951).
46. See OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAV (1953).
47. People v. Tower, 308 N. Y. 123, 123 N. E. 2d 805 (1954), noted supra,
p. XX, where defendant unsuccessfully pleaded his right to be sentenced under
the punitive section of the penal law rather than the rehabilitative provision of
the Correction Law, on the theory that he was "beyond redemption."
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of societal stigma, to eliminate the possibility of the individual's seeking refuge in
an undesirable outgroup as a result of ostracization from his customary social
group. Thus, upon diagnostic determination that a particular offender falls within
the category of "normal" criminal, that his offense is not motivated by seriously
neurotic or psychotic propensities toward crime, and that his superego demands
expiation of the offense, it may be pragmatic and beneficial from the standpoint of
society and the individual to impose punishment of a severity proportionate to the
guilt feelings of the individual. In these cases punishment may have the flavor of
the medieval rack as long as it is devoid of societal stigma. Punishment, to be
effective, may have to be severe, but severity again must have a subjective meaning
to the offender. Thus what may be severe punishment to one might in no way
constitute punishment to another.
Juvenile delinquents might successfully be punished by the assignment of a
part of each day to some sort of labor, with community praise and admiration
emanating therefrom, rather than social shame and disgrace. At this time, this
mechanism can facilitate reimbursement for the injuries perpetrated on others.
The physical efforts expended by the child are sufficiently suggestive of punishment to him. The repugnance of society to punish juveniles for most crimes is
abortive of rehabilitation, as demonstrated by the following statement of a child
under eighteen: 48 "If you're under eighteen, you can get away with anything except
murder." A study made by the Gluecks49 divided a group of juvenile offenders
into a control group, to which was administered the usual sanctions in the usual
institutions, and an experimental group, which was therapeutically treated. The
deleterious effects of this latter program of kindness, sympathy, and tolerance are
flagrantly exposed to us. There was an 88.2% rate of recidivism in the experimental group, this being higher than that in the control group. The writers suggest
that a possible explanation for this result lies in the fact that punishment was
denied the experimental group. The Gluecks failed to arrive at any satisfactory
explanation, though inadequate facilities and failure to treat the experimental
group for any significant length of time may have been relevant factors.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The current indiscriminate application of punitive devices, reminiscent of
the medieval penal system, can no longer be tolerated in the light of present
learning, especially when its proponents fail even to admit that it rests upon the
foundation of satiation of public vengeance. Having eliminated the lex talionis
as a legitimate method, we must procede to prescribe punishment in a manner
48.

DOUGLAS, INCREASING RATE OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
GLUECK, 1,000 JUVENILE DELINQUENTS (1934).

49. See S.&E.

245 (1950).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
designed to achieve legitimate ends, the protection of the community's health and
welfare and rehabilitation of social deviants.
We have cursorily examined some of the significant facets of punishment
and the penal system, and various proposed modifications, alterations and improvements which might be made; individualized treatment utilizing positive sanctions
seems ultimately the only feasible method of punishment administration for these
purposes. The potential danger inherent in such a program is apparent-a failure
of procedural safeguards is always imminent in a system of individualized standards,
norms and treatment-but assurance that the basic safeguards will be maintained
can be provided. In the light of prevailing conditions, the writers advocate a
temporary compromise that would improve upon the present system, utilizing some
existing and proposed reforms. The unpredictable human elements which permeate
the entire area render remote the universal utilization of individualized therapy
in such a way as to accomplish the maximum possible deterrence. But in spite of
the difficulty of successfully treating the numerous criminal types which range
from normal to psychotic, and although some attitudes of society will have to be
clarified and possibly drastically revised, the present dilemma of conflicting policy
considerations must be resolved; the legislature, executive and judiciary must be
reconciled to seemingly radical innovations if we are to make any significant
forward progress from the medieval conception of vindictive retaliation first
incorporated in the Code of Hammurabi. 50
-Arnold T. Lieberman and
Dawn B. Girard
50. 1780-1750 B.C.

